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Abstract
This paper proposes a critical analysis of the “Academic Ranking of World Uni-
versities”, published every year by the Institute of Higher Education of the Jiao
Tong University in Shanghai and more commonly known as the Shanghai ranking.
After having recalled how the ranking is built, we ﬁrst discuss the relevance of
the criteria and then analyze the proposed aggregation method. Our analysis uses
tools and concepts from Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM). Our main
conclusions are that the criteria that are used are not relevant, that the aggrega-
tion methodology is plagued by a number of major problems and that the whole
exercise suﬀers from an insuﬃcient attention paid to fundamental structuring is-
sues. Hence, our view is that the Shanghai ranking, in spite of the media coverage
it receives, does not qualify as a useful and pertinent tool to discuss the “quality”
of academic institutions, let alone to guide the choice of students and family or to
promote reforms of higher education systems. We outline the type of work that
should be undertaken to oﬀer sound alternatives to the Shanghai ranking.
Keywords: Shanghai ranking, multiple criteria decision analysis, evaluation
models, higher education.
Doit-on croire le classement de Shangaï ?
Une approche par l’analyse multicritère
Résumé
Cet article présente une analyse critique du « classement de Shangaï »
publié annuellement par l’Institute of Higher Education de l’université
Jiao Tong à Shangaï. Après avoir rappelé comment ce classement est
construit, on analyse tout d’abord la pertinence des critères retenus
puis on discute de la méthode d’agrégation utilisée. Nos conclusions
principales sont que les critères retenus ne sont pas pertinents, que la
méthode d’agrégation utilisée est aﬀectée de problèmes très sérieux et
qu’enﬁn l’exercice souﬀre d’une attention insuﬃsante accordée à des
questions fondamentales liées à la manière de structurer le problème.
En conclusion, le classement de Shangaï, en dépit de l’attention média-
tique qu’il suscite, ne nous semble pas être un outil utile pour discuter
de la « qualité » des institutions d’enseignement supérieur et moins
encore pour promouvoir des réformes de ce système ou guider le choix
des familles et des étudiants. On propose en conclusion quelques pistes
permettant de bâtir des outils plus adaptés à ces objectifs.
Mots-clés : Classement de Shangaï, analyse multicritère, modèles d’éva-
luation, enseignement supérieur.
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1 Introduction
A strange thing happened back in 2003. A group of people belonging to the
Institute of Higher Education from the Jiao Tong University in Shanghai published
on their web site their ﬁrst “Academic Ranking of World Universities” (Shanghai
Jiao Tong University, Institute of Higher Education, 2003–09), henceforth the
Shanghai ranking 1. This ranking consisted in an ordered list of 500 universities
in the whole world. Since then, the same group publishes each year an updated
version of the ranking. A description of the ranking can be found in Liu and Cheng
(2005), whereas the story behind its creation is detailed in Liu (2009).
This ranking was almost immediately the subject of an extraordinary media
coverage. Not only political decision makers used the results of the ranking so as
to promote reforms of higher education systems but many academic institutions
began to use their position in this ranking in their institutional communication.
Apparently, this looks like a true success story.
Yet, almost immediately after the release of the ﬁrst ranking, this enterprize
has been the subject of ﬁerce attacks. One of the earlier one was due to van Raan
(2005a), which started a vigorous exchange with the authors of the ranking (Liu,
Cheng, and Liu, 2005, van Raan, 2005b). Since then the attacks have been numer-
ous and vigorous both in the academic literature (Buela-Casal, Gutiérez-Martínez,
Bermúdez-Sánchez, and Vadillo-Muñoz, 2007, Dill and Soo, 2005, Gingras, 2008,
Ioannidis, Patsopoulos, Kavvoura, Tatsioni, Evangelou, Kouri, Contapoulos-Ioannidis,
and Liberopoulos, 2007, van Raan, 2006, Vincke, 2009, Zitt and Filliatreau, 2006)
and in various reports and position papers (Bourdin, 2008, Brooks, 2005, Dal-
sheimer and Despréaux, 2008, Desbois, 2007, HEFCE, 2008, Kävelmark, 2007,
Kivinen and Hedman, 2008, Marginson, 2007, Saisana and D’Hombres, 2008, Stella
and Woodhouse, 2006). Moreover, several special issues of the journal Higher Ed-
ucation in Europe (published by the OECD) have been devoted to the debate
around university rankings (HEE 2002, HEE 2005, HEE 2007, HEE 2008). In
views of such attacks, one could have expected a sharp decrease in the popularity
of the Shanghai ranking. It could even have triggered the authors to stop pub-
lishing it. Quite the contrary happened. Each year, a new version of the ranking
is released and each year the media coverage of the ranking seems to increase.
Moreover, projects of transformation of higher education systems often appeal to
the results of the Shanghai ranking. For instance, the present Minister of Re-
1 Since then, the authors of the Shanghai ranking have also produced, starting in 2007, a rank-
ing of institutions distinguishing 5 diﬀerent ﬁelds within Science (Natural Sciences and Mathe-
matics, Engineering / Technology and Computer Sciences, Life and Agriculture Sciences, Clinical
Medicine and Pharmacy, and Social Sciences), see http://www.arwu.org/ARWU-FIELD2008.htm.
Since the methodology for these “ﬁeld rankings” is quite similar to the one used for the “global
ranking” analyzed in this paper, we will not further analyze them here.
1
search and Higher Education was given by the French President the mission “to
have two institutions among the world top 20 and ten among the world top 100”
(letter dated 5 July 2007, source http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/
francais/interventions/2007/juillet/lettre_de_mission_adressee_a_mme_
valerie_pecresse_ministre_de_l_enseignement_superieur_et_de_la_recherche.
79114.html, last accessed 30 March 2009, our translation from French).
This paper wishes to be a contribution to the analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of the Shanghai ranking. Our point of view will be that of Opera-
tional Researchers having worked in the ﬁeld of evaluation and decision models
with multiple criteria (Bouyssou, Marchant, Pirlot, Perny, Tsoukiàs, and Vincke,
2000, Bouyssou, Marchant, Pirlot, Tsoukiàs, and Vincke, 2006, T’kindt and Bil-
laut, 2006), while most of the previous analyses of the Shanghai ranking have
concentrated on bibliometric aspects, starting with the important contribution of
van Raan (2005a).
The Shanghai ranking apparently aims at answering the following question:
“What is the best university in the world?”. To some of our readers, this very
question may indeed seem rather childish and without much interest. We agree.
Nevertheless, these readers are reminded that there may be lazy political decision-
makers around that may want to use the results of a ranking that simply “is
there”. More importantly, there may also be strategic decision-makers that may
try to use these results in order to promote their own views on how to reorganize
a higher education system. Moreover, as happens with all management tools, the
mere existence of a ranking will contribute to modify the behavior of the agents
involved, creating changes that are sometimes unwanted. Hence, we think that it
may be worth spending some time on the question. This is the purpose of this
paper. It is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will brieﬂy describe how the
authors of the Shanghai ranking operate. Section 3 will discuss the various criteria
that are used. Section 4 will present a Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
view on the Shanghai ranking. A ﬁnal section will discuss our ﬁndings.
2 How the Shanghai ranking is built?
This section describes how the Shanghai ranking is built, based upon Shanghai
Jiao Tong University, Institute of Higher Education (2003–09) and Liu and Cheng
(2005). We concentrate on the last edition of the ranking published in 2008 2
although the methodology has varied over time.
2 See http://www.arwu.org/rank2008/ARWU2008Methodology(EN).htm, last accessed 30
March 2009
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2.1 Who are the authors of the ranking?
The Institute of Higher Eduction of the Jiao Tong University in Shanghai is a small
group of people headed by Professor Nian Cai Liu. The authors of the ranking
admit that they have no particular knowledge in bibliometry (e.g., Nian Cai Liu is
a chemist specialized in polymers). Our analysis below shows that it is likely that
they have no particular knowledge in MCDM and in the development of evaluation
systems either.
The authors insist upon the fact that they receive no particular funding for
producing the ranking and that they are guided mainly by academic considerations.
This is at variance with the situation for rankings such as the one produced by
the Times Higher Education Supplement (Times Higher Education Supplement,
2008).
2.2 What are their objectives?
Somewhere at the turn of the last century, the question of the renovation of the
higher education system in continental China became important. This should be
no surprise in view of the political situation in China and its growing economic
strength.
The announced objective of the authors of the ranking is to have a tool al-
lowing them understand the gap between Chinese universities and “world-class
universities”, with the obvious and legitimate aim of reducing this gap. Note that
the authors do not give a precise deﬁnition of what they mean by a “world-class
university”. Because of the diﬃculty to obtain “internationally comparable data”,
they decided to rank order universities based on “academic or research perfor-
mance” (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Institute of Higher Education, 2003–09).
2.3 How were the universities selected?
The authors claim to have analyzed around 2000 institutions worldwide. This is
supposed to include all institutions having Nobel prize and Fields medal laureates,
a signiﬁcant number of papers published in Nature or Science, of highly cited re-
searchers as given by Thomson Scientiﬁc (formerly ISI), and a signiﬁcant amount
of publications indexed in the Thomson Scientiﬁc databases. The authors of the
ranking claim that this includes all major universities in each country. The pub-
lished ranking includes only 500 institutions. The ﬁrst 100 are ranked order. The
remaining ones are rank by groups of 50 (till the 201th position) and then 100.
3
2.4 The criteria
The authors use six criteria belonging to four distinct domains. They are presented
below.
2.4.1 Quality of Education
This domain uses a single criterion: the number of alumni of the institution having
received a Nobel prize (Peace and Literature are excluded, the Bank of Sweden
prize in Economics included) or a Fields medal. An alumni is deﬁned as a person
having obtained a Bachelor, a Master or a Doctorate in the institution. If a
laureate has obtained a degree from several institutions, each one receives a share.
Remember that Nobel prizes are attributed (on an annual basis) since 1901 and
Fields medal (every four years) since 1936. All prizes and medals do not have
the same weight: they are “discounted” using a simple linear scheme (an award
received after 1991 counts for 100 %, an award received between 1981 and 1990
counts for 90 %, . . . ). When several persons are awarded the prize or the medal,
each institution receives a share. This deﬁnes the ﬁrst criterion labeled ALU.
2.4.2 Quality of Faculty
This domain has two criteria. The ﬁrst one counts the number of academic staﬀ
from the institution having received a Nobel prize (with the same deﬁnition as
above) or a Fields medal. The conventions for declaring that someone is a member
of the “academic staﬀ” of an institution remain fuzzy. The following discounting
scheme is applied: 100% for winners in after 2001, 90% for winners in 1991–2000,
80% for winners in 1981–1990, . . . , 10% for winners in 1911–1920. The case of
multiple winners is treated as with criterion ALU. When a person has several
aﬃliations, each institution receives a share. This deﬁnes criterion AWA
The second criterion in this domain is the number of highly cited researchers in
each of the 21 areas of Science identiﬁed by Thomson Scientiﬁc. These highly cited
researchers, in each of the 21 domains, consist in a list of 250 persons who have
received the largest number of citations in the domain according to the Thomson
Scientiﬁc databases (source http://hcr3.isiknowledge.com/popup.cgi?name=
hccom, last accessed 30 March 2009. In some categories, Thomson Scientiﬁc lists
more than 250 names. We suspect that this is due to ties). This is computed over
a period of 20 years. This deﬁnes criterion HiCi.
2.4.3 Research output
This domain has two criteria. The ﬁrst one is the number of papers published in
Nature and Science by the members of the academic staﬀ of an institution during
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the last 5 years. This raises the problem of processing papers having multiple
authors. The rule here is to give a weight of 100% to the corresponding author
aﬃliation, 50% for ﬁrst author aﬃliation (second author aﬃliation if the ﬁrst
author aﬃliation is the same as corresponding author aﬃliation), 25% for the next
author aﬃliation, and 10% for other author aﬃliations. This deﬁnes criterion
N&S. Since this criterion is little relevant for institutions specialized in Social and
Human Sciences, it is “neutralized” for them.
The second criterion counts the number of papers published by the members
of the academic staﬀ of an institution. This count is performed using Thomson
Scientiﬁc databases over a period of one year. Since it is well known that the
coverage of the Thomson Scientiﬁc databases is not satisfactory for Social and
Human Sciences, a coeﬃcient of 2 is allocated to each publication indexed in the
Social Science Citation Index. This deﬁnes criterion PUB.
2.4.4 Productivity
This domain has a single criterion. It consists in the “total score of the above ﬁve
indicators divided by the number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) academic staﬀ”.
This criterion is “ignored” when the number of FTE academic staﬀ could not be
obtained. This deﬁnes criterion Py.
2.5 Data collection
Except for the number of FTE academic staﬀ of each institution, data are col-
lected on the web. This involves the oﬃcial site of the Nobel Prizes (http://
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/), the oﬃcial site of the International Mathemat-
ical Union (http://www.mathunion.org/general/prizes, and various Thomson
Scientiﬁc sites (http://www.isihighlycited.com and http://www.isiknowledge.
com). The data used by the authors of the ranking are not made publicly available.
2.6 Normalization and aggregation
Each of the above six criteria is measured by a positive number. Each criterion is
normalized as follows. A score of 100 is given to the best scoring institution and
all other scores are normalized accordingly. This leads to a score between 0 and
100 for each institution.
The authors say that “adjustments are made” when the statistical analyses
reveal “distorting eﬀects”. The nature and the scope of these adjustments are
not made public (Florian, 2007, shows that these adjustments are nevertheless
important).
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The authors use a weighted sum to aggregate these normalized scores. The
weights of the six criteria are ALU: 10%, AWA: 20%, N&S: 20%, HiCi: 20%,
PUB: 20%, and Py: 10%. Hence each institution receives a score between 0 and
100. The ﬁnal scores are then normalized again so that the best institution receives
a score of 100. This ﬁnal normalized score is used to rank order the institutions.
2.7 The 2008 results
Table 1 gives the list of the best 20 universities in the world according to the 2008
edition of the Shanghai ranking. Table 2 does the same for European universities.
A cursory look at Table 1 reveals the domination of US universities in the
ranking. Only 3 among the top 20 are not from the US. This may explain why so
many European decision makers have strongly reacted to the Shanghai ranking.
Within Europe, the domination of the UK is striking. Relatively small coun-
tries like Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, or The Netherlands seem to perform well,
whereas larger countries like Italy or Spain are altogether absent from the top 20
in Europe.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the global normalized score for the 500
institutions included in the Shanghai ranking. The curve becomes very ﬂat as
soon as one leaves the top 100 institutions.
We would like to conclude this brief presentation of the Shanghai ranking by
giving three quotes taken from Liu and Cheng (2005). The Shanghai ranking: uses
“carefully selected objective criteria”, is “based on internationally comparable data
that everyone can check”, and is such that “no subjective measures were taken”.
3 An analysis of the criteria
We start our analysis of the Shanghai ranking by an examination of the six criteria
that it uses.
3.1 Criteria linked to Nobel prizes and Fields medals
Two criteria (ALU and AWA) are linked to a counting of Nobel prizes and of Fields
medals. These two criteria are especially problematic.
Let us ﬁrst observe that, for criterion AWA, the prize and medals are attributed
to the hosting institution at the time of the announcement. This may not be too
much of problem for Fields medals (they are only granted to people under 40).
This is however a major problem for Nobel prizes. Indeed, a close examination of
the list of these prizes reveals that the general rule is that the prize is awarded
long after the research leading to it has been conducted. A classic example of such
6
Rank Institution Country ALU AWA HiCi N&S PUB Py Score
1 Harvard USA 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 74.1 100.0
2 Stanford USA 40.0 78.7 86.6 68.9 71.6 66.9 73.7
3 UC Berkeley USA 69.0 77.1 68.8 70.6 70.0 53.0 71.4
4 Cambridge UK 90.3 91.5 53.6 56.0 64.1 65.0 70.4
5 MIT USA 71.0 80.6 65.6 68.7 61.6 53.9 69.6
6 CalTech USA 52.8 69.1 57.4 66.1 49.7 100.0 65.4
7 Columbia USA 72.4 65.7 56.5 52.3 70.5 46.6 62.5
8 Princeton USA 59.3 80.4 61.9 40.5 44.8 59.3 58.9
9 Chicago USA 67.4 81.9 50.5 39.5 51.9 41.3 57.1
10 Oxford UK 59.0 57.9 48.4 52.0 66.0 45.7 56.8
11 Yale USA 48.5 43.6 57.0 55.7 62.4 48.7 54.9
12 Cornell USA 41.5 51.3 54.1 52.3 64.7 40.4 54.1
13 UC Los Angeles USA 24.4 42.8 57.4 48.9 75.7 36.0 52.4
14 UC San Diego USA 15.8 34.0 59.7 53.0 66.7 47.4 50.3
15 U Pennsylvania USA 31.7 34.4 58.3 41.3 69.0 39.2 49.0
16 U Wash Seattle USA 25.7 31.8 53.1 49.5 74.1 28.0 48.3
17 U Wisc Madison USA 38.4 35.5 52.6 41.2 68.1 28.8 47.4
18 UC San Francisco USA 0.0 36.8 54.1 51.5 60.8 47.5 46.6
19 Tokyo Univ Japan 32.2 14.1 43.1 51.9 83.3 35.0 46.4
20 Johns Hopkins USA 45.8 27.8 41.3 48.7 68.5 24.8 45.5
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best
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universities
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Rank Institution Country ALU AWA HiCi N&S PUB Py Score
4 Cambridge UK 90.3 91.5 53.6 56.0 64.1 65.0 70.4
10 Oxford UK 59.0 57.9 48.4 52.0 66.0 45.7 56.8
22 U Coll London UK 31.2 32.2 38.6 44.3 65.8 35.4 44.0
24 Swiss Fed Inst Tech Ű Zurich Switzerland 35.9 36.3 36.1 38.1 53.6 56.0 43.1
27 Imperial Coll UK 18.6 37.4 39.9 38.2 61.8 39.4 42.4
40 U Manchester UK 24.4 18.9 28.2 28.3 60.5 30.4 33.6
42 U Paris 06 France 36.6 23.6 23.1 27.3 58.2 21.3 33.1
45 U Copenhagen Denmark 27.4 24.2 26.3 25.4 54.5 33.4 33.0
47 U Utrecht Netherlands 27.4 20.9 28.2 28.8 53.3 26.0 32.4
49 U Paris 11 France 33.3 46.2 14.6 20.4 47.0 23.1 32.1
51 Karolinska Inst Stockholm Sweden 27.4 27.3 31.8 18.3 50.1 25.7 31.6
53 U Zurich Switzerland 11.2 26.8 24.7 27.5 50.2 32.4 31.0
55 U Edinburgh UK 20.2 16.7 26.3 32.3 49.7 30.0 30.8
55 U Munich Germany 33.1 22.9 16.3 25.6 52.7 31.8 30.8
57 TU Munich Germany 41.1 23.6 25.3 18.9 44.8 30.6 30.5
61 U Bristol UK 9.7 17.9 28.2 28.1 47.8 33.5 29.5
64 U Oslo Norway 23.1 33.4 17.9 17.0 46.7 29.8 29.0
67 U Heidelberg Germany 17.7 27.2 17.9 20.4 49.2 29.3 28.4
68 U Helsinki Finland 16.8 17.9 21.9 20.8 53.8 30.1 28.3
70 Moscow State U Russia 49.1 34.2 0.0 8.3 53.2 33.4 28.1
T
able
2:
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he
best
20
universities
in
E
urope
in
the
Shanghai
ranking
(2008).
Source:
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(2003–09).
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Figure 1: Distribution of normalized scores for the 500 universities in the Shang-
hai ranking (2008). Source: Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Institute of Higher
Education (2003–09).
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a situation is Albert Einstein. He conducted his research while he was employed
by the Swiss Patent Oﬃce in Zurich. He received the Nobel Prize long after, while
he was aﬃliated to the University of Berlin (we will say more on the case of Albert
Einstein below). Therefore, it does not seem unfair to say that the link between
AWA and the quality of research conducted in an institution is, at best, extremely
approximative. Even when the winner of a Nobel prize has not moved, the lag
between the time at which the research was conducted and the time at which the
award was announced is such that the criterion captures more the past qualities
of an institution than its present research potential. The same is clearly true for
criterion ALU since the time lag is here even longer. At best, this criterion might
give some indication on the ability an institution had several decades ago to give
extremely bright people a stimulating environment. It has almost nothing to do
with the present ability of an institution to provide an excellent in education to
its students.
One may also wonder why prizes attributed long ago (before World War II and
even before World War I) have anything to do with the present quality of an insti-
tution. Although the discounting scheme adopted by the authors of the Shanghai
ranking tends to limit the impact of these very old prizes and medals, they still
have some eﬀect. It should also be stressed that the discounting scheme that is
adopted is completely arbitrary (e.g., why use a linear and not an exponential
scheme?)
The options taken by the authors of the ranking on these two criteria involve
many other biases. A bias in favor of countries having know few radical political
changes since 1901. A bias towards institutions having been created long ago and
having kept the same name throughout their history. This is not the case for most
institutions in continental Europe (think of the many wars and radical political
changes that have happened in Europe since 1901). This has led to really absurd
situations. For instance the two universities (Free university of Berlin and Hum-
boldt University, using their names in English) created in Berlin after the partition
of Germany and, therefore, the splitting of the University of Berlin, quarrelled over
which one should get the Nobel Prize of Albert Einstein (see Enserink, 2007, on
this astonishing case). It turned out that depending on the arbitrary choice of the
university getting this prize, these two institutions had markedly diﬀerent positions
in the ranking.
Unfortunately, Germany is not an isolated example. Table 3 lists some French
Nobel prize winners together with their aﬃliation as indicated by the oﬃcial Nobel
prize web site (http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/). A careful examination
of this table reveals many interesting facts. First there are, in this list, institutions
that have never existed (except maybe, in medieval times). Sorbonne University,
whether or not translated into French, has never existed as such and surely does not
10
Institution Name Prize Date
Sorbonne University Henri Moissan Chemistry 1906
Sorbonne University Gabriel Lippmann Physics 1908
Sorbonne University Marie Curie Chemistry 1911
Sorbonne University Charles Richet Medicine 1913
Sorbonne University Jean Perrin Physics 1925
Sorbonne University & Institut Henri Poincaré Louis de Broglie Physics 1929
Strasbourg University Karl Braun Physics 1909
École municipale de physique et de chimie industrielle Pierre Curie Physics 1903
Nancy University Victor Grignard Chemistry 1912
Toulouse University Paul Sabatier Chemistry 1912
University of Grenoble Louis Néel Physics 1970
Université de Paris Jean Dausset Medicine 1980
Université Louis Pasteur & Collège de France Jean-Marie Lehn Chemistry 1987
ESPC & CERN Georges Charpak Physics 1992
Collège de France Pierre-Gilles de Gennes Physics 1991
Collège de France & École Normale Supérieure Claude Cohen-Tannoudji Physics 1997
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presently exist (although a building called Sorbonne does exist in Paris). A second
problem lies in multiple aﬃliations. To which institution should go the Nobel Prize
of Louis de Broglie. It should go either to Sorbonne University (but we have just
seen there is no such institution) or to the Institut Henri Poincaré that, for sure, is
not a university. There are also many cases in which the Nobel prize is attributed
to the right institution, but that institution does not exist any more (Strasbourg
University, Nancy University, Toulouse University, Université de Paris, University
of Grenoble, École municipale de physique et de chimie industrielle). Another
intriguing case is the Nobel prize of Georges Charpak who has two aﬃliations
ESPC and CERN. Since CERN is not a university, should all the prize go the
ESPC or only half of it? (note that ESPC is the new name of the École municipale
de physique et de chimie industrielle). This shows, for the case of France, that the
correct attribution of each prize requires a very good knowledge of the institutional
landscape in each country and to take many “micro-decisions”. Since the authors of
the Shanghai ranking do not document any of these micro-decisions, the least that
can be said is that these two counting criteria are at best, orders of magnitudes.
We would like to conclude here with a sad note. The last French Physics
Nobel Prize winner, Albert Fert, is a Professor at the Université de Paris Sud. He
happens to work in a joint research center (CNRS & Université de Paris Sud).
It seems that because of this only fact, only half his Nobel Prize will go to his
university (Fert, 2007). We really wonder why.
Summarizing, the two criteria ALU and AWA are only very loosely connected
with what they are trying to capture. Their evaluation furthermore involves arbi-
trary parameters and raises many diﬃcult counting problems. Hence, these criteria
are plagued by a signiﬁcant imprecision and inaccurate determination (Bouyssou,
1989, Roy, 1988).
3.2 Highly cited researchers
The most striking fact here is the complete reliance of the authors of the ranking
on choices made by Thomson Scientiﬁc. Is the division of Science into 21 domains
relevant? In view of Table 4, it is apparent that the choice of these 21 domains
seems to favor medicine and biology. This may be a reasonable option for a
commercial ﬁrm like Thomson Scientiﬁc, since theses ﬁelds generate many “hot”
papers. The fact that this choice is appropriate in order to evaluate universities
would need to be justiﬁed and, unfortunately, the authors of the ranking remain
silent on this point.
Finally, as already stressed in van Raan (2005a), these 21 categories do not
have the same size. Speaking only in terms of the number of journals involved
in each categories (but keep in mind that journals may have quite diﬀerent sizes)
they are indeed quite diﬀerent. Space Science involves 57 journals, Immunology
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21 categories used by Thomson Scientiﬁc
Agricultural Sciences Materials Science
Engineering Plant & Animal Science
Neuroscience Computer Science
Biology & Biochemistry Mathematics
Geosciences Psychology / Psychiatry
Pharmacology Ecology / Environment
Chemistry Microbiology
Immunology Social Sciences, General
Physics Economics & Business
Clinical Medicine Molecular Biology & Genetics
Space Sciences
Table 4: The 21 categories used by Thomson Scientiﬁc (source: http://www.
isihighlycited.com/isi_copy/Comm_newse04.htm#ENGINEERING, last accessed
30 March 2009).
120, . . . , Plant & Animal Science 887, Engineering 977, Social Science General
1299, and Clinical Medicine 1305 (source: http://www.isihighlycited.com/
isi_copy/Comm_newse04.htm#ENGINEERING, last accessed 30 March 2009).
As observed in van Raan (2005a), this criterion clearly uses Thomson Scientiﬁc
citation counts. Bibliometricians have often stressed that these citation counts are
somewhat imprecise. Indeed, the matching of cited papers involves “losses” (e.g.,
due to incorrect spelling or wrong page numbers). van Raan (2005a) evaluates the
average loss of citations to 7%, while it may be as high as 30% in certain ﬁelds.
Bizarrely, Liu et al. (2005) answering these comments, simply did not acknowledge
that criterion HiCi uses citation counts.
Finally, let us observe that Thomson Scientiﬁc uses a period of 20 years to
determine the names of highly cited researchers in each category. Hence, in most
categories, the persons in these lists are not particularly young and have often
changed institutions several times during their careers.
Summarizing, combining the exclusive reliance on a division of Science into
21 categories suggested by Thomson Scientiﬁc, the use of rather long period of
reference, and the diﬃculties inherent to a precise counting of citations reveals
that this criterion is only extremely loosely connected to with the present ability
of an institution to presently produce research with high impact.
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3.3 Papers in Nature and Science
Probably the most surprising fact with this criterion is the weighting scheme for
multiple authors (remember that this is the usual rule in the “hard sciences”).
With 100% for the corresponding author, 50% for the ﬁrst author, 25% for the
next author aﬃliation, and 10% for other author aﬃliations, one quickly sees that
all papers published in Nature and Science do not have the same weight. A paper
signed by many co-authors will have a greater weight than a paper signed by a sin-
gle person (therefore it is in the interest of an institution that any paper published
in Nature and Science is co-signed by many co-authors from the same institution).
We have to say that this seems highly counter-intuitive and even paradoxical. We
should also mention that the problem of aﬃliation that we examine below are also
present for this criterion.
3.4 Articles indexed by Thomson Scientific
As stressed in van Raan (2005a), the authors of the ranking entirely relies for the
evaluation of this criterion on the Thomson Scientiﬁc databases. This raises a
number of important problems.
First, the attribution of the papers to the right institution is far from being
an easy task. The authors of the ranking solve it saying that “institutions or
research organizations aﬃliated to a university are treated according to their own
expression in the author aﬃliation of an article” (Liu et al., 2005). This is likely
to lead to many problems. First, it is well known that authors do not always
pay much attention to the standardization of their aﬃliation when they publish
a paper. The problem is especially serious when it comes to papers published by
university hospitals (they often have a speciﬁc name that is distinct from the name
of the university and have a distinct address, see van Raan, 2005a, Vincke, 2009)
A similar phenomenon occurs when university has an oﬃcial name that is not in
English. Some authors will use the oﬃcial name (which is likely to cause problems
if it contains diacritical signs or, even worse, if it is a transliteration). Some might
try to translate it into English, causing even more confusion. A famous example
is the diﬃculty to distinguish the Université Libre de Bruxelles from the Vrije
Universiteit Brussel. Both are located in Brussels and have the same postal code.
Both names are the same in English (Free University of Brussels). Hence this ﬁrst
problem is likely to cause much imprecision on the evaluation of criterion PUB 3.
3 Let us mention here that even expert bibliometricians may not be aware of some of the
potential problems. van Raan (2005a) mentions that a paper that has the aﬃliation “CNRS,
Illkirsh” should go to the Université Louis Pasteur. We want to stress that although this may
be possible, this is not automatically correct since the above aﬃliation could well mean that
we have a paper coming from an employee of the CNRS working a joint research unit managed
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Attaching to each author a correct aﬃliation is a diﬃcult task requiring a deep
knowledge of the peculiarities of the institutional arrangements in each country.
Second, it is well known that the coverage of the Thomson Scientiﬁc is in no
way perfect (Adam, 2002). The newly created SCOPUS launched by Elsevier,
has a vastly diﬀerent coverage, although clearly, the intersection between the two
databases is not empty. Counting using Thomson Scientiﬁc instead of SCOPUS is
a perfectly legitimate choice, provided that the impact of this choice on the results
is carefully analyzed. This is not the case in the Shanghai ranking.
Third, it is also well known that the coverage of most citation database has
a strong slant towards publications in English (see van Leeuwen, Moed, Tijssen,
Visser, and van Rann, 2001, van Raan, 2005a, for an analysis of the impact of
this bias on the evaluation of German universities). Yet, there are disciplines
(think of Law) in which publications in a language that is not the language of the
country make very little sense. Moreover, there are whole parts of Science that
do not use articles in peer-reviewed journals as the main media for the diﬀusion
of research. In many parts of Social Science, books are still a central media,
whereas in Engineering or Computer Science, conference proceedings dominate.
The authors of the ranking have tried to correct for this bias against Social Sciences
by multiplying by a factor 2 all papers indexed in the Social Science Citation Index.
This surely goes in the right direction. But it is also quite clear that this coeﬃcient
is arbitrary and that the impact of varying it should be carefully analyzed.
Finally, we may also wonder why the authors of the ranking have chosen to
count indexed papers instead of trying to measure the impact of the papers. Brows-
ing through the Thomson Scientiﬁc databases quickly reveals that most of indexed
papers are almost never cited and that a few of them concentrate most citations,
this being true independently of the impact of the journal.
Summarizing, criterion PUB raises several important problems and involves
many arbitrary choices.
3.5 Productivity
Criterion Py consists in the “total score of the above ﬁve indicators divided by the
number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) academic staﬀ”. It is ignored when this
last number could not be obtained. Two main things have to be stressed here.
First this criterion is clearly aﬀected by all the elements of imprecision and
inaccurate determination analyzed above for the ﬁrst ﬁve criteria. Moreover, the
authors of the ranking do not detail which sources they use to collect information
on the number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) academic staﬀ. We have no reason
by the CNRS and the Université Louis Pasteur (now merged with the two other universities in
Strasbourg).
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to believe that these sources of information are more “reliable” than the ones used
by the authors of the ranking to evaluate the ﬁrst ﬁve criteria. If this information
is collected through the institutions themselves, there is a risk of potential serious
problems, since the notion of “member of academic staﬀ” is not precisely deﬁned
and may be interpreted in several quite distinct ways (e.g., how to count invited
or emeritus professors, teaching assistants, research engineers, pure researchers?).
Second, it is not 100% clear what is meant by the authors when they refer to
the “total score of the above ﬁve indicators”. Are these scores ﬁrst normalized? Are
these scores weighted? (we suspect that this is the case). Using which weights?
(we suspect that these weight are simply the weights of the ﬁrst ﬁve indicators
normalized to add up to 1).
3.6 A varying number of criteria
Institutions are evaluated in the Shanghai ranking using six criteria. . . but not all
of them. In fact we have seen that there are several possible cases:
• institutions not specialized in Social Sciences and for which FTE academic
staﬀ data could be obtained are evaluated on 6 criteria: ALU, AWA, HiCi,
N&S, PUB, and Py.
• institutions not specialized in Social Sciences and for which FTE academic
staﬀ data could not be obtained are evaluated on 5 criteria: ALU, AWA,
HiCi, N&S, and PUB.
• institutions specialized in Social Sciences and for which FTE academic staﬀ
data could be obtained are evaluated on 5 criteria: ALU, AWA, HiCi, PUB,
and Py.
• institutions specialized in Social Sciences and for which FTE academic staﬀ
data could not be obtained are evaluated on 4 criteria: ALU, AWA, HiCi,
and PUB.
This raises many questions. First MCDM has rarely tackled the situation in which
alternatives are not evaluated on the same family of criteria. This raises many
interesting questions. For instance the right way to meaningfully “neutralize” a
criterion does not seem to be entirely obvious. Second, the authors of the Shanghai
ranking do not make publicly available the list of institutions that they consider
to be specialized in Social and Human Sciences. They neither give the list of
institutions for which criterion Py could be computed. Hence not only the family
of criteria varies but it is impossible to know which family is used to evaluated
what. This is extremely surprising and most uncommon.
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3.7 A brief summary on criteria
We have seen that all criteria used by authors of the ranking are only loosely con-
nected with what they intended to capture. The evaluation furthermore involves
several arbitrary parameters and many micro-decisions that are not documented.
In view of Figure 1, we surely expect all these elements to quite severely impact the
robustness of the results of the ranking. Quite unfortunately, since the authors
of the Shanghai ranking do not make “raw data” publicly available (a practice
which does not seem to be fully in line with their announced academic motives),
it is impossible to analyze the robustness of the ﬁnal ranking with respect to these
elements.
We have seen above that the authors claim that the ranking: uses “carefully
selected objective criteria”, is “based on internationally comparable data that ev-
eryone can check”, and is such that “no subjective measures were taken”.
It seems now clear that the criteria have been chosen mainly based on availabil-
ity, that each one of them is only loosely connected with what should be captured
and that their evaluation involves the use of arbitrary parameters and arbitrary
micro-decisions. The impact of these elements on the ﬁnal result is not examined.
The raw data that is used are not made publicly available so that they cannot be
checked.
We take this occasion to remind the reader that there is a sizeable literature on
the question of structuring objectives, associating criteria or attributes to objective,
discussing the adequateness and consistency of a family of criteria. This literature
has two main sources. The ﬁrst one originates in the psychological literature (Ebel
and Frisbie, 1991, Ghiselli, 1981, Green, Tull, and Albaum, 1988, Kerlinger and
Lee, 1999, Kline, 2000, Nunally, 1967, Popham, 1981) has concentrated on the
question of the validity and reliability and has permeated the bulk of empirical
research in Social Sciences. The second originates from MCDM (Bouyssou, 1990,
Fryback and Keeney, 1983, Keeney, 1981, 1988a,b, 1992, Keeney and McDaniel,
1999, Keeney and Raiﬀa, 1976, Keeney, Hammond, and Raiﬀa, 1999, Roy, 1996,
Roy and Bouyssou, 1993, von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) has concentrated
on the question of the elicitation of objectives and the question of the construction
of attributes or criteria to measure the attainment of these objectives. It seems to
have been mostly ignored by the authors of the ranking.
3.8 Final comments on criteria
We would like to conclude this analysis of the criteria used in the Shanghai ranking
with two sets and remarks.
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3.8.1 Time effects
The authors have chosen to publish their ranking on an annual basis. This is
probably a good choice if what is thought is media coverage. However, given
the pace of most research programs, we cannot ﬁnd any serious justiﬁcation for
such a periodicity. As observed in Gingras (2008), the ability of a university to
produce excellent research, is not likely to change much from one year to another.
Therefore, changes from one edition of the ranking to the next one are more
likely to reﬂect random ﬂuctuations than real changes (empirical psychological
research has amply shown that decision makers are not very eﬃcient in realizing
that random variations are much more likely than structural changes, see, e.g.,
Bazerman, 1990, Dawes, 1988, Hogarth, 1987, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky,
1981, Poulton, 1994, Russo and Schoemaker, 1989). This is all the more true that
several important points in the methodology and the criteria have changed over
the years (Saisana and D’Hombres, 2008, oﬀer an overview of these changes).
The second point is linked to the choice of an adequate period of reference to
assess the “academic performance” of an institution. This is a diﬃcult question.
It has been implicitly answered by the authors of the ranking in a rather strange
way. Lacking any clear analysis of the problem, they mix up in the model several
very diﬀerent time periods: one century for criteria ALU and AWA, 20 years for
criterion HiCi, 5 years for criterion N&S, and 1 year for criterion PUB 4. There
may be a rationale behind these choices. It is not made explicit by the authors
of the ranking. As observed in van Raan (2005a), “academic performance” can
mean two very diﬀerent things: the prestige of an institution based on its past
performances and its present capacity to attract excellent researchers. These two
elements should not be confused.
3.8.2 Size effects
Five of the six criteria used by the authors of the ranking are counting criteria
(prizes and medals, highly cited researchers, papers in N&S, papers indexed by
Thomson Scientiﬁc). Hence, it should be no surprise that all these criteria are
strongly linked to the size of the institution. As Zitt and Filliatreau (2006) have
forcefully shown, using so many criteria linked to the size of the institution is the
sign that big is made beautiful. Hence, the fact that criteria are highly correlated
should not be a surprise. Although the authors of the Shanghai ranking view this
fact as a strong point of their approach, it is more likely to simply reﬂect the
4 Let us note that this period of 1 year seems especially short. The computation of the Impact
Factors of journals by Thomson Scientiﬁc uses a 2 year time period, see http://admin-apps.
isiknowledge.com.gate6.inist.fr/JCR/help/h_impfact.htm#impact_factor, last accessed
30 March 2009, and impact factors over a period of ﬁve years are also computed
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impact of size eﬀects.
Moreover since the criteria used by the authors of the ranking are linked with
“academic excellence”, we should expect that they are poorly discriminatory be-
tween institutions that are not ranked among the top ones. A simple statistical
analysis reveals that this is indeed the case. Table 5 gives the mean value for the
ﬁrst ﬁve criteria used by the authors of the ranking according to the rank of the
institutions (this is based in the 2008 edition of the ranking; similar ﬁgures would
be obtained with previous editions).
It is apparent that criteria ALU and AWA contribute almost to nothing in the
ranking of institutions that are not in the top 100. Furthermore, criteria HiCi and
N&S have very small values at the bottom of the list. Hence, for these institutions,
criteria PUB mostly explains what is going on. This is at much variance with the
presentation of the ranking as using multiple criteria.
4 An MCDM view on the Shanghai ranking
In the previous section, we have proposed a critical analysis of the criteria used
by the authors of the Shanghai ranking. This analysis is well in line with the
observations in van Raan (2005a) and Ioannidis et al. (2007). We now turn to
questions linked with the methodology used by the authors to aggregate these
criteria.
4.1 A rhetorical introduction
Suppose that you are giving a Master course on MCDM. The evaluation of stu-
dents is based on an assignment consisting in proposing and justifying a particular
MCDM technique on an applied problem. The subject given to your students this
year consists in devising a technique that would allow to “rank order countries
according to their ‘wealth’”. Consider now the case of three diﬀerent students.
The ﬁrst student has proposed a rather complex technique that has the fol-
lowing feature. The fact that country a is rank before or after country b does
not only depend on the data collected on countries a and b but also with what
happens with a third country c. Although we might imagine situation in which
such a phenomenon could be admitted (see Luce and Raiﬀa, 1957, Sen, 1993), our
guess is that you will ﬁnd that this student is completely out of her mind.
Consider a second student that has proposed a simple technique that works as
follows. For each country she has collected the GNP (Gross national Product) and
the GNPpc (Gross national Product per capita) of this country. She then suggests
to rank order the countries using a weighted average of the GNP and the GNPpc
of each country. Our guess is that you will ﬁnd that this student is completely
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Table 5: Mean values of criteria according to ranks (source: 2008 ARWU ranking).
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tions having a null score. For criteria HiCi and N&S, we indicate in parenthesis
the percentage of institutions having a null score and the standard deviation of
the score. For criteria PUB, we indicate in parenthesis the standard deviation of
the score. The apparent irregularity of ranks is due to ties, as reported in the 2008
ARWU ranking.
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out of her mind. Either you want to measure the “total wealth” of a country
and you should use the GNP or you want to measure the “average richness” of
its inhabitants and you should use the GNPpc. Combining theses two measures
using a weighted average makes no sense: the ﬁrst is a “production” measure,
the second is a “productivity” measure. Taking α times production plus (1 − α)
times productivity is something that you can compute but that has absolutely no
meaning, unless, of course, if α is 0 or 1. The reader who is not fully convinced
that this does not make sense is invited to test the idea using statistics on GNP
and GNPpc that are widely available on the web.
Consider now a third student who has proposed a complex model but that has:
• not questioned the relevance of the task,
• not reﬂected on what “wealth” is and how it should be measured,
• not investigated the potential impacts of her work,
• only used readily available information on the web without questioning its
relevance and precision,
• has mixed this information with highly subjective parameters without inves-
tigating their inﬂuence of the results.
Clearly you will ﬁnd that this student is completely out of her mind. She has
missed the entire diﬃculty of the subject reducing it to a mere number-crunching
exercise.
We are sorry to say that the authors of the ranking do not seem to be in a
much better position than any of these three students. They have, in their work,
combined all what we have found to be completely unacceptable in the work of
our three students.
4.2 The aggregation technique used is flawed
One of the ﬁrst thing that is invariably taught in any basic course on MCDM is the
following. If you aggregate several criteria using a weighted sum, the weights that
are used should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the “importance” of the criteria.
This may seem strange but is in fact very intuitive. Weights, or rather scaling
constants as we call them in MCDM, are indeed linked to the normalization of
the criteria. If normalization changes, weights should change. A simple example
should help the reader not familiar with MCDM understand this point. Suppose
that one of your criterion is a measure of length. You may choose to measure this
criterion in meters, but you may also choose to measure it in kilometers. If you
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use the same weight for this criterion in both cases, you will clearly end up with
absurd results.
This has two main consequences. First, weights in a weighted sum cannot
be assessed on the basis of a vague notion of “importance”. The comparison of
weights do not reﬂect a comparison of importance. Indeed, if the weight of a
criterion measured in meters is 0.3 this weight should be multiplied by 1 000 if
you decide to measure it in kilometers. Therefore the comparison of this weight
with the weights of other criteria does not reﬂect a comparison of importance
(it may well happen that the weight of criterion length, when this criterion is
measured in meters, is smaller than the weight of another criterion, while the
opposite comparison will prevail when this criterion is measured in kilometers).
This has many important consequences on the correct way to assess weights in a
weighted sum (see Bouyssou et al., 2006, Keeney and Raiﬀa, 1976). In any case,
it does not make sense to ask someone directly for weights (as the authors of the
ranking do on their web site). This also raises the problem on how the authors of
the Shanghai have chosen their set of weights. They oﬀer no clue on this point.
It seems safe to consider that the weights have been chosen arbitrarily. The only
rationale we can imagine for this choice is that, in the ﬁrst version of the ranking,
the authors used only ﬁve criteria with equal weights. Although the use of equal
weights may be justiﬁed under certain circumstances (see Einhorn and Hogarth,
1975), we have no reason to believe that they apply here.
A more devastating consequence is the following. If you change the normaliza-
tion of the criteria, you should absolutely change the weights to reﬂect this change.
If you do not do so, this amounts to changing the weights. . . and you will end up
with nonsensical results. Since, each year, the authors of the ranking normalize
their criteria giving the score of 100 to the best scoring institution on each crite-
rion, and, since each year the non-normalized score of the best scoring institution
on this criterion is likely to change, the weights should change each year so as to
cope with this new normalization. But the authors of the ranking do not change
the weights 5. Hence they use each year a diﬀerent set of weights!
Let us illustrate what can happen with a simple example using two criteria. Let
us consider the data in Table 6. In this table, eight alternatives (or institutions) a,
b, c, d, e, f , g and h are evaluated on two criteria g1 and g2 (the average values that
are used in this example roughly correspond to criteria PUB and 10×HiCI). These
criteria are normalized so as to give a score of 100 to the best scoring alternative on
each criterion (here, h on both criteria). This deﬁnes the two normalized criteria
gn
1
and gn
2
. For instance we have gn
2
(f) = 35 = (175× 100)/500. Let us aggregate
these two criteria with a weighted sum using equal weights. This deﬁnes the ‘Score’
column in Table 6 (it is not necessary to normalize again the global score, since the
5 Keeney (1992, p. 147) calls this the “most common critical mistake”
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alternatives g1 g2 gn1 g
n
2
Score Rank
h 2 000 500 100.00 100.00 100.0 1
a 160 435 8.00 87.00 47.5 2
b 400 370 20.00 74.00 47.0 3
c 640 305 32.00 61.00 46.5 4
d 880 240 44.00 48.00 46.0 5
e 1 120 175 56.00 35.00 45.5 6
f 1 360 110 68.00 22.00 45.0 7
g 1 600 45 80.00 9.00 44.5 8
Table 6: Weighted sum: example with equal weights
score of h is already 100). If we use this global score to rank order the alternatives,
we obtain the following ranking (a ≻ b means that a is preferred to b):
h ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f ≻ g.
Consider now a similar situation in which everything remains unchanged except
that the performance of h on g2 increases: it is now 700 instead of 500. This leads
to the data in Table 7. The two criteria are again normalized so as to give a
score of 100 to the best scoring alternative on each criterion (here again, h on
both criteria). But because the score of h on g2 has changed, this impacts all
normalized scores on gn
2
. If you decide to aggregate the two normalized criteria
using the same weights as before, you end up with the following ranking:
h ≻ g ≻ f ≻ e ≻ d ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a.
Observe that the modiﬁcation of the score of h on g2 has inverted the ranking of all
other alternatives! The intuition behind this “paradox” should be clear. Since the
score of h on g2 has changed, we have changed the normalization of criterion gn2 .
Because the normalization has changed, the weight of this criterion must change
if we want to be consistent. Instead of using weights equal to 0.5 and to 0.5, we
should now use diﬀerent weights so as to reﬂect this change of normalization.
This “paradox” can be made even stronger by using the following example.
Start with Table 6 and suppose now that everything remains unchanged except
that h increases its performance on g2 and that a, being in second position, in-
creases its performance on both g1 and g2. Intuitively we would expect that since
h and a were ranked in the ﬁrst two positions and since they have both improved,
they should clearly remain ranked on top. But this is not so. This is detailed in
Table 8. The ﬁnal ranking is now:
h ≻ g ≻ f ≻ e ≻ d ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a.
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alternatives g1 g2 gn1 g
n
2
Score Rank
h 2 000 700 100.00 100.00 100.00 1
a 160 435 8.00 62.14 35.07 8
b 400 370 20.00 52.86 36.43 7
c 640 305 32.00 43.57 37.79 6
d 880 240 44.00 34.29 39.14 5
e 1 120 175 56.00 25.00 40.50 4
f 1 360 110 68.00 15.71 41.86 3
g 1 600 45 80.00 6.43 43.21 2
Table 7: Weighted sum with equal weights: h increases on g2
Again, a counterintuitive situation occurs: institution a, the only one besides h
having progressed, is now ranked last!
alternatives g1 g2 gn1 g
n
2
Score Rank
h 2 000 700 100.00 100.00 100.00 1
a 165 450 8.25 64.29 36.27 8
b 400 370 20.00 52.86 36.43 7
c 640 305 32.00 43.57 37.79 6
d 880 240 44.00 34.29 39.14 5
e 1 120 175 56.00 25.00 40.50 4
f 1 360 110 68.00 15.71 41.86 3
g 1 600 45 80.00 6.43 43.21 2
Table 8: Weighted sum: h increases on g2 and a increases on both g1 and g2
Observe that the failure to change weights when normalization changes has
very strange eﬀects besides the ones just mentioned. If an institution is weak on
some criterion, so that a competitor is ranked just before it, its interest is that
the best scoring alternative on this particular criterion improves its performance:
if the weights are kept unchanged, this will mechanically decrease the importance
of this criterion and will eventually allow it to be ranked before its competitor.
Therefore if an institution is weak on some criterion, its interest is that diﬀerence
between its performance and the performance of the best scoring criterion on this
criterion increases!
Because the authors of the ranking felt into this elementary trap, it seems
safe to conclude that their results are absolutely of no value. A rather tortuous
argument could be put forward in order to try to salvage the results of the Shanghai
ranking saying that the data is such that, whatever the weights, the results are
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g1 g2
a 5 19
b 20 4
c 11 11
d 4 6
Table 9: Weighted sum: unsupported eﬃcient alternatives
always the same. In view of Figure 1, it seems clear that such an argument does
not apply here 6.
Let us conclude with a ﬁnal remark on the aggregation technique that is used.
Even if the authors of the ranking had not fallen in the trap explained above (and,
clearly, there are very simple steps that could be taken to correct this point),
the weighted sum would remain a poor way to aggregate criteria. Almost all of
Bouyssou et al. (2000) is devoted to examples explaining why this is so. Let us
simply recall here the classical problem of the existence of unsupported efficient
alternatives, in the parlance of MCDM. An alternative is said to be dominated if
there is an alternative that has better evaluations on all criteria and a strictly better
one on some criterion. An alternative is efficient if it not dominated. Clearly,
all eﬃcient alternatives appear as reasonable candidates: all of them should be
in position to be ranked ﬁrst with an appropriate choice of weights. Yet, with a
weighted sum, there are eﬃcient alternatives that cannot be ranked ﬁrst, whatever
the choice of weights.
Table 9 gives an example (taken from Bouyssou et al., 2000) of such a situ-
ation, using two criteria to be maximized. Observe that there are three eﬃcient
alternatives in this example: a, b, and c (alternative d is clearly dominated by all
other alternatives). Intuitively, alternative c appears to be a good candidate to be
ranked ﬁrst: it performs reasonably well on all criteria, while a (resp. b) is excellent
on criterion 1 (resp. 2) but seems poor on criterion 2 (resp. 2). However, if the
two criteria are aggregated using a weighted sum, it is impossible to ﬁnd weights
that would rank c on top. Indeed, suppose that they are weights α and 1−α that
would allow to do so. Ranking c before a implies 11α+11(1−α) > 5α+19(1−α),
i.e., α > 8/15 ≈ 0.53. Ranking c before b implies 11α+11(1−α) > 20α+4(1−α),
i.e., α < 7/16 ≈ 0.44. Figure 2 shows that this impossibility is due to the fact
that c is dominated by a convex combination of a and b (this convex combination
of a and b dominating c is not unique).
Recent research in MCDM have exhibited a wealth of aggregation techniques
6 The reader may want to check what is the ﬁnal ranking based on Table 6 using the weights
0.6 and 0.4.
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g1
g2
a
b
c
d
Figure 2: Unsupported eﬃcient alternatives
that do not have such a major deﬁciency (Belton and Stewart, 2001, Bouyssou
et al., 2000).
4.3 The aggregation technique that is used is nonsensical
Criteria ALU, AWA, HiCi, N&S, and PUB are counting criteria. It is therefore
rather clear that they are globally linked to the ability of an institution to produce
a large amount of good papers and good researchers. They capture, up to the
remarks made in Section 3, the research potential of an institution. This is seman-
tically consistent. However, criterion Py is quite diﬀerent. If the ﬁrst ﬁve criteria
capture “production” the last one captures “productivity”. But common sense and
elementary economic analysis strongly suggest that taking a weighted average of
production and productivity, although admissible from a purely arithmetic point
of view, leads to a composite index that is meaningless (we use the word here in its
ordinary sense and not in its measurement-theoretic sense, see Roberts, 1979). The
only argument that we can think of in favor of such a measure is that the weight
of the last criterion is rather small (although, we have seen above that weights in
a weighted sum should be interpreted with great care). Nevertheless, the very fact
that production is mixed up with productivity seems to us highly problematic and
indicates a poor reﬂection on the very meaning of what an adequate composite
index should be. The projects of the authors of the ranking, as announced in Liu
et al. (2005, p. 108), to build a ranking with a weight of 50% for the criterion Py,
are a clear sign that this semantic problem has not been fully understood by the
authors of the ranking. This severely undermines the conﬁdence one can have in
the results of the ranking.
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4.4 Neglected structuring issues
When trying to build an evaluation model, good practice suggests (Bouyssou et al.,
2000, JRC/OECD, 2008) that the reﬂection should start with a number of simple
but crucial questions:
1. What is the deﬁnition of the objects to be evaluated?
2. What is the purpose of the model? Who will use it?
3. How to structure objectives?
4. How to achieve a “consistent family of criteria”?
5. How to take uncertainty, imprecision, inaccurate deﬁnition into account?
Concerning the last three questions, we have seen in Section 3 that the work of the
authors of the Shanghai ranking could be subjected to severe criticisms. This is
especially true for the last question: since raw data are not made publicly available
the many micro-decisions that led to these data are not documented, it is virtually
impossible to analyze the robustness of the proposed ranking. The partial analyses
conducted in Saisana and D’Hombres (2008) show that this robustness is likely to
extremely weak.
Let us concentrate here on the ﬁrst two questions keeping in mind a number
of good practices for the construction of an evaluation model.
4.4.1 What is a “university”?
This question might sound silly to most our readers coming from the US and the
UK. However for a reader coming from continental Europe this question is not
always an easy one. Let us take here the example of France, which is, admittedly,
a particularly complex example. In France co-exit:
• Public universities (usually named Universités). What should be observed
here is that the history of most of these universities has been long and
somewhat erratic. After 1968, most of them were split into several smaller
ones (which explains why most of French universities carry numbers in their
names). Moreover, there are many newly created universities in France that
are rather small and do not oﬀer programs in all areas of Science and/or do
not oﬀer programmes at all levels of the Bachelor-Master-Doctorate scale.
Finally, when analyzing the French system, it should be kept in mind that
these universities rarely attract the best students. They rather choose to en-
ter the Grandes Écoles system. Tuition fees in these universities are generally
small.
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• Grandes Écoles (mainly in Engineering, Management and Political Science)
are very particular institutions. They are usually quite small and most of
them only grant Master degrees. They are highly selective institutions that
are recruiting students after a nationwide competitive exam. They have a
long tradition and a very active network of alumni. Only very few of them
are actively involved in Doctoral programs. Tuition fees in Grandes Écoles
vary a lot. Some of them are quite expensive (mostly management schools)
while in some others, the fees are comparable to that of a public university.
Finally, in some of them, (e.g., the Écoles Normales Supérieures), students
are paid.
• Large public and private research institutes that may have common research
centers, among them or with universities or Grandes Écoles. Among the
public research centers we should mention: CNRS, INSERM (specialized in
biomedical research), INRA (specialized in agricultural sciences) and INRIA
(specialized in Computer Science). A very signiﬁcant part of research in
France is conducted in such institutes, although they have no student and
grant no diploma. Moreover, there are large and renowned private research
centers, the most famous one being Institut Pasteur (many of the French
Nobel prizes in Medicine are linked to it).
With such a complex institutional landscape, what should count as a university is
far from being obvious. It seems that this was not obvious to the authors of the
ranking, that included in their 2003 edition the Collège de France, an institution
that has no student and grants no diploma. The French situation is especially
complex but is far from being exceptional. Germany and Italy have strong Public
Research centers, besides their universities, too.
Any evaluation system should minimally start with a clear deﬁnition of the
objects to be evaluated. Such a deﬁnition is altogether lacking in the Shanghai
ranking.
4.4.2 What is a “good” university?
The authors of the ranking are interested in “world-class” universities. But, as
they have not proposed a deﬁnition of what a university is, they do not oﬀer a
deﬁnition of what a “world class” university is. Nevertheless the criteria they use
allow to implicitly deﬁne what they mean here. The only thing of importance is
“excellence” in research. Moreover this excellence is captured using very particular
criteria evaluated in a very particular way (see Section 3). Why ignore research
outputs such as patents, books or PhD theses? Why count papers instead of trying
to measure impact?, etc.
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Perhaps the most perplexing thing in the implicit deﬁnition of a world class
university used by the authors of the ranking is that it mostly ignores inputs and
institutional constraints.
Some universities have a more-or-less complete freedom to organize their gov-
ernance, to hire and ﬁre academic and non-academic staﬀ, to decide on salaries,
to select students, to decide on tuition fees. Some others have almost no freedom
in all these respects (this is mostly the case for French universities). They cannot
select students, they cannot decide on tuition fees, they are not fully involved in
the selection of their academic staﬀ, and ﬁring someone is diﬃcult. Given such dif-
ferences in institutional constraints, should we simply ignore them, as is implicitly
done in the ranking? This is only reasonable if one admits that there is “one best
model” of a world-class university. This hypothesis would need detailed empirical
justiﬁcation that is not oﬀered by the authors of the Shanghai ranking.
Similarly the “inputs” consumed by institutions in their “scientiﬁc production
process” are mostly ignored. The only input that is explicitly taken into account
is the number of FTE academic staﬀ, when it could be obtained. But there are
many other important inputs that should be included, if one is to judge on the
eﬃciency of a scientiﬁc production process. Let us simply mention here that tuition
fees, funding (Harvard’s annual budget is over 3 × 109 USD in 2007, Harvard
University, 2007, p. 38; this is larger than the GDP of Laos), quality of campus,
libraries (Harvard’s libraries possess over 15 × 106 volumes, Harvard University,
2007), academic freedom to research and publish on any subject of interest, etc.
are also very important ingredients in the success of a university. Ignoring all
these inputs implies a shallow and narrow view on academic excellence. We surely
disagree here with Principle 8 in International Ranking Expert Group (2006): a
production process, whether it is or not scientiﬁc, cannot be analyzed without
explicitly considering inputs and outputs.
The implicit deﬁnition that is used by the author of the Shanghai ranking
should be clear at this point. It roughly consists in an institution:
1. that is old and has kept its name (preferably a simple English one without
diacritical signs) throughout its history,
2. coming from a country that has not experienced major political and social
changes and that is peaceful democracy,
3. coming from a country in which the organization of the higher education
system is simple (no dual system, no research centers around),
4. coming from a country speaking English,
5. having much freedom with respect to its governance,
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6. having much freedom in hiring and ﬁring staﬀ and deciding on salaries,
7. being well funded.
We do not want to claim that such an implicit deﬁnition is nonsensical. We only
want to point out that it more or less corresponds to the deﬁnition of the Ivy
League (plus “Oxbridge”).
4.4.3 What is the purpose of the model?
To us, the very interest of ranking “universities” is not obvious at all. Indeed, who
can beneﬁt from such a ranking?
Students and families looking for information are much more likely to be inter-
ested in a model that will evaluate programs. We are all aware of the fact that a
good university may be especially strong in some areas and quite weak in others.
Moreover, it seems clear that (although we realize that each family might want to
consider its child as a future potential Nobel Prize winner) students and families
are likely to be interested in rather trivial things such as tuition fees, quality of
housing, sports facilities, quality of teaching, reputation of the program in ﬁrms,
average salaries after graduation, strength of alumni association, campus life, etc.
For an interesting system oﬀering such details, we refer to Berghoﬀ and Federkeil
(2009) and Centre for Higher Education Development (2008).
Recruiters are likely to little impressed by a few Nobel prizes granted long
ago to members of a given department, if they consider recruiting some with a
Master degree coming from a totally diﬀerent department. Clearly, they will be
mostly interested in the “employability” of students with a given degree. Besides
the criteria mentioned above for students and families, things like the mastering of
foreign languages, international experience, internships, etc. are likely be of central
importance to them.
Likewise, a global ranking of universities is quite unlikely to be of much use to
deans and rectors willing to work towards an increase in quality. Clearly, managers
of a university will be primarily interested in the identiﬁcation of weak and strong
departments, the identiﬁcation of the main competitors, and the indication of pos-
sible directions for improvement. Unless they have a contract explicitly specifying
that they have to increase the position of their institution in the Shanghai ranking
(as astonishing as it may sound, this has happened), we do not see how a ranking
of an institution as whole can lead to a useful management tool.
Finally, political decision makers should be primarily interested in an evaluation
system that would help them decide on the eﬃciency of the higher education
system of a country. If a country has many good medium-sized institutions, it is
unlikely that many of them will be standing high in the Shanghai ranking. But
this does not mean that the system as a whole is ineﬃcient. Asking for “large”
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and “visible” institutions in each country may involve quite an ineﬃcient use of
resources. Unless the authors of the ranking can produce clear empirical evidence
that scientiﬁc potential is linked with size and that medium-sized institutions
simply cannot produce valuable research, we do not understand why all this may
interest political decision makers, except, of course, to support other strategic
objectives.
4.4.4 Good evaluation practices
As detailed in Bouyssou et al. (2000) and Bouyssou et al. (2006), there are a
number of good practices that should be followed when building an evaluation
model. We want only to mention two of them here.
The ﬁrst one is fairly obvious. If you evaluate a person or an organization,
you should allow that person or organization to check the data is collected on
her/it. This seems quite obvious. Not doing so, inevitably leads to a bureaucratic
nightmare in which each one is evaluated based on data that remain “behind the
curtain”. We have seen that this elementary good practice has been forgotten by
the authors of the ranking.
The second good practice we would like to mention is less clear-cut, but is
nevertheless crucial. When an evaluation system is conceived, its creators should
not expect the persons or the organizations that are evaluated to react passively to
the system. This is the baseline of any introductory management courses. Persons
and organizations will adapt their behavior, consciously or not, in reaction to
the evaluation system. This feedback is inevitable and perverse eﬀects due to such
adaptations are inescapable (all this has been well documented in the management
literature, Berry, 1983, Boudon, 1979, Dörner, 1996, Hatchuel and Molet, 1986,
Mintzberg, 1979, Moisdon, 2005, Morel, 2002). A good practice is therefore the
following. Try to anticipate the most obvious perverse eﬀects that can be generated
by your evaluation system. Try to conceive a system in which the impacts of the
most undesirable perverse eﬀects are reduced. It does not seem that the authors
of the ranking have followed this quite wise advice. The only words of wisdom
are here that “Any ranking exercise is controversial, and no ranking is absolutely
objective” and that “People should be cautious about any ranking and should not
rely on any ranking either, including the ‘Academic Ranking of World Universities’.
Instead, people should use rankings simply as one kind of reference and read the
ranking methodology carefully before looking at the ranking lists” (Shanghai Jiao
Tong University, Institute of Higher Education, 2003–09). Sure enough. But
beyond that, we surely expect the developers of an evaluation system to clearly
analyze the potential limitations of what they have created in order to limit, as
far as possible, its illegitimate uses and the authors of the ranking remain silent
on this point.
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Suppose that you manage a university and that you want increase your position
in the ranking. This is simple enough. There are vast areas in your university that
do not contribute to your position in the ranking. We can think here of Law,
Humanities and most Social Sciences. Drop all these ﬁelds. You will surely save
much money. Use this money to buy up research groups that will contribute to
your position in the ranking. Several indices provided by Thomson Scientiﬁc are
quite useful for this purpose: after all, the list of the potential next ﬁve Nobel
prizes in Medicine is not that long. And, anyway, if the group is not awarded
the prize, it will publish much in journals that count in the ranking and are quite
likely to be listed among the highly cited researchers. This tends to promote a
view of Science that much resembles professional sports in which a few wealthy
teams compete worldwide to attract the best players. We are not fully convinced
that this is the best way to increase human knowledge, to say the least.
Manipulations are almost as simple and as potentially damaging for govern-
ments. Let us take for example the case of the French government, since we
have brieﬂy evoked above the complex organization of the French higher educa-
tion system. Most French universities were split in several smaller part in the
early seventies. The idea was then to create organizations that would be easier to
manage. Indeed, the venerable Université de Paris gave rise to no less than 13
new universities. But we have seen that this is surely detrimental in the ranking.
So you should give these universities strong incentives to merge again. Neglecting
the rather marginal impact of the last criterion, a simple calculation shows that
merging the universities in Paris that are mainly oriented towards hard sciences
and medicine (there is clearly no interest to merge with people doing such futile
things as Law, Social Sciences and Humanities), i.e., Paris 5, 6, 7 and 11 (these
are not the oﬃcial names but their most common names), would lead (using the
data from the 2007 Shanghai ranking) to an institution that would roughly be at
the level of Harvard University. Bingo! You are not spending one more Euro, you
have surely not increased the scientiﬁc production and potential of your country,
you have created a huge organization that will surely be rather diﬃcult to man-
age. . . but you have impressively increased the position of France in the Shanghai
ranking. Can you do even more? Sure, you can. Public research centers, although
quite eﬃcient, count for nothing in the ranking. You can surely suppress them
and transfer all the money and persons to the huge organization you have just
created. Then, you will surely end up much higher than Harvard University. . .
No need to say that all these manipulations are likely to lead, in the long term,
to disastrous results. But since they will only occur in the long term, we confess
that French political decision makers seem to be no exception to the rule stat-
ing that political decision makers trade oﬀ short term and long term eﬀects in
rather strange ways. Indeed, as witnessed, for instance, by the recent merger of
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the three universities in Strasbourg (that has taken eﬀect on 1 January 2009, see
http://demain.unistra.fr/, last accessed 30 March 2009) and the new law on
the organization and autonomy of public universities (numbered 2007-1199 and
dated 10 August 2007), they have started working in this direction.
5 Where do we go from here?
Let us now summarize our observations on the Shanghai ranking and try to draw
some conclusions based on our ﬁndings, both on a scientiﬁc and a more strategic
level.
5.1 An assessment of the Shanghai ranking
In what was probably the ﬁrst serious analysis of the Shanghai ranking, van Raan
(2005a) stated that “From the above considerations we conclude that the Shanghai
ranking should not be used for evaluation purposes, even not for benchmarking”
and that “The most serious problem of these rankings is that they are considered as
‘quasi-evaluations’ of the universities considered. This is absolutely unacceptable”.
We surely agree. The rather radical conclusions of van Raan were mainly based on
bibliometric considerations, to which the authors of the Shanghai ranking proved
unable to convincingly answer (Liu et al., 2005, van Raan, 2005b).
Our own analysis adopted a point of view that reﬂects our slant towards
MCDM. Adding an MCDM point of view to the bibliometric analysis of van Raan
(2005a) inevitably leads to an even more radical conclusion. Indeed, we have seen
all criteria used by authors of the ranking are only loosely connected with what
they intended to capture. The evaluation of these criteria involves several arbi-
trary parameters and many micro-decisions that are not documented. Moreover,
we have seen that the aggregation method that is used is ﬂawed and nonsensical.
Finally, the authors of the ranking have paid almost no attention to fundamental
structuring issues.
Therefore, it does not seem unfair to say that the Shanghai ranking is a poorly
conceived quick and dirty exercise with no value whatsoever. Again any of our
MCDM student that would have proposed such a methodology in her Master’s
Thesis would have surely failed according to our own standards.
Although we have concentrated here on the Shanghai ranking, it is clear that
much the same analysis (and conclusions) could (and should) be applied to the
Times higher Education Supplement ranking (Times Higher Education Supple-
ment, 2008). We leave it up to the interested reader (for a vigorous critical analysis
of the US News and World Report ranking, we refer to Ehrenberg, 2003).
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5.2 What can be done?
An optimistic point of view would be that, after having read our paper, the authors
of the ranking would decide to immediately stop their work, apologizing for having
created so much confusion in the academic world, and that all political decision-
makers would immediately stop using “well know international rankings” as means
to promote their own strategic objectives. However, we live in the real world and
our bet is that this will not happen. Since the authors of Shanghai ranking more
or less decided to ignore the point of view of van Raan (2005a), we think much
likely that they will ignore ours. Therefore, we expect that they will continue for
a long time to produce an annual ranking. Also, we should not expect too much
of the ability of political decision makers to abandon easy-to-use arguments that
look striking enough in the general media. Therefore, we will have to live in a
world in which extremely poor rankings are regularly published and used. What
wan be done then? Well, several things.
The ﬁrst, and the more easy one, should be to stop being naive. “What is
the best wine in the world?”, “What is the best car in the world?”, “Where is
the most pleasant city in Europe?”, etc. All these questions may be interesting
if your objective is to sell many copies of a newspaper or a book. However, it is
clear that all these questions are meaningless unless they are preceded by a long
and diﬃcult structuring work. Clearly the “best car in the world” is a meaningless
concept unless you have identiﬁed stakeholders, structured their objectives, studied
the various ways in which attributes can be conceived to measure the attainment
of these objectives, applied meaningful procedures to aggregate this information
and performed an extensive robustness analysis. Doing so, you might arrive at a
model that can really help someone choose a car, or alternatively help a government
to prepare new standards for greenhouse gas emissions. Without this work, the
question is meaningless 7. If the question is meaningless for cars, should we expect
a miracle when we turn to incredibly more complex objects such as universities?
Certainly not. There is no such thing as a “best university” in abstracto. Hence,
a ﬁrst immediate step is that we suggest is the following. Stop talking about
these “all purpose rankings”. They are meaningless. Lobby in our own institution
so that these rankings are never mentioned in institutional communication. This
is, of course, especially important for our readers “lucky” enough to belong to
institutions that are well ranked. They should resist the temptation of saying or
thinking “there is almost surely something there” and stop using the free publicity
oﬀered by these rankings.
Since the production of poor rankings is unlikely to stop, a more proactive way
7 The same is true for wines. Some “experts” have popularized the idea of “grading wines”.
This process has has undoubtedly made them rich but has also resulted in an incredible impov-
erishment of the variety of wines that are produced in Europe.
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to ﬁght them is to produce many alternative rankings that produce vastly diﬀerent
results. It is not of vital importance that these new rankings are much “better” in
some sense that the Shanghai ranking. Their main usefulness will be to “dilute” its
devastating eﬀects. A very interesting step in the direction was taken in ENSMP
(2007). The École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris (ENSMP) is a French
Grande École, being very prestigious in France. Its size is such that it is clear that
it will never appear in good position in the Shanghai ranking. Hence, the ENSMP
has decided to produce an alternative ranking. It can be very simply explained
since it is based on a single criterion: the number of alumni of an institution
having become the CEO of one of the top 500 leading companies as identiﬁed by
Fortune (we refer to ENSMP, 2007, for details on how this number is computed).
We do not regard this ranking as very attractive. Indeed, the performances of the
various institutions are based on things that happened long ago (it is quite unusual
to see someone young becoming the CEO of a very large company). Therefore
this number has little relation with the present performance of the institution.
Moreover, this criterion is vitally dependent upon the industrial structures of the
various countries in the world (institutions coming from countries in which industry
is highly concentrated have a clear advantage) and “network eﬀects” will have
a major impact on it (we know that these eﬀects are of utmost importance to
understand the French Grandes Écoles system). Yet, we do not consider that
the ENSMP is much worse than the Shanghai ranking. On the contrary, it quite
clearly points out the arbitrariness of many of the criteria used by the authors of
the Shanghai ranking. Finally and quite interestingly, the ENSMP gives results
that are vastly different from the Shanghai ranking. The top 10 institutions in
this ranking have no less than 5 French institutions (École Polytechnique, HEC,
Sciences Po, École Nationale d’Administration, and ENSMP). Among these ﬁve
institutions, three are not even mentioned in the top 500 of the Shanghai ranking
(HEC, Sciences Po, and École Nationale d’Administration). Diluting the eﬀects
of the Shanghai rankings clearly calls for many more rankings of this kind.
5.3 Why don’t you propose your own ranking?
We have been fairly negative on the Shanghai ranking (but fair, as far as we can
judge). The reader, already exhausted at this point, may legitimately wonder why
we do not now suggest another, better, ranking. We will refrain here of doing so
for various reasons.
First, this is not our main ﬁeld of research. We are not experts in education
systems. We are not experts in bibliometry. Contrary to the authors of the ranking,
we do think that a decent ranking should obviously be the product of a joint
research team involving experts in evaluation, education systems and bibliometry.
Second, we do not underestimate the work involved. Although we think that
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the Shanghai ranking is of very poor quality, producing it is a huge task. A
better ranking will inevitably involve even more work, based on the reasonable
assumption that there is no free lunch.
Third, we are not at all convinced that this exercise can be of any use to
any serious person. We have explained why we would tend to rank programs or
national education systems instead universities. We have also given several clues
on what should be done and what should absolutely not be done. We hope that
these guidelines will be helpful for readers willing to take up to this task.
Let us ﬁnally observe that the combination of Operational Research (OR) with
sophisticated bibliometric evaluation tools seem to oﬀer good promises for evalua-
tion systems that would really help improve the quality of Science, the only thing,
after all, we are interested in. Because the issue of bibliometric techniques has
been extensively dealt with elsewhere (Moed, De Bruin, and van Leeuwen, 1995,
Moed, 2006, van Raan, 2005c, 2006, Zitt, Ramanana-Rahary, and Bassecoulard,
2005), we will concentrate here on a few potentially useful OR techniques.
We have already mentioned how the absence of a minimal knowledge of ag-
gregation techniques and their properties, as studied in MCDM, may vitiate an
evaluation technique. We would like here to add that OR has also developed quite
sophisticated tools to help structuring problems (Checkland, 1981, Checkland and
Scholes, 1990, Eden, 1988, Eden, Jones, and Sims, 1983, Friend and Hickling, 1987,
Ostanello, 1990, Rosenhead, 1989) and to use this work together with sophisticated
aggregation tools (Ackermann and Belton, 2006, Bana e Costa, Ensslin, Corrêa,
and Vansnick, 1999, Belton, Ackermann, and Shepherd, 1997, Montibeller, Ack-
ermann, Belton, and Ensslin, 2008, Phillips and Bana e Costa, 2007). A parallel
development concerns methods designed to assess the eﬃciency of “decision making
units” that transform several inputs into several outputs, known as Data Envel-
opment Analysis (DEA) (Banker, Charnes, and Cooper, 1984, Charnes, Cooper,
and Rhodes, 1978, Cherchye, Moesen, Rogge, van Puyenbroeck, Saisana, Saltelli,
Liska, and Tarantola, 2008, Cook and Zhu, 2008, Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, 1999,
Norman and Stoker, 1991). The potential of such techniques for building evalua-
tion models in higher education systems has been already recognized (Bougnol and
Dulá, 2006, Johnes, 2006, Leitner, Prikoszovits, Schaﬀhauser-Linzatti, Stowasser,
and Wagner, 2007, Turner, 2005, 2008). We suspect that a wise combination of the
above two approaches is quite likely to lead to interesting evaluation models. It
could well be combined with the promising interactive approach developed by the
Center for Higher Education in Germany (Berghoﬀ and Federkeil, 2009, Centre for
Higher Education Development, 2008).
36
5.4 The role of Europe
We would like to conclude with a word on Europe. Our view is that the Euro-
pean Union has a huge responsibility in the development of alternative evaluation
tools. Europe has a long, complex, and unfortunately violent history. It is nev-
ertheless rich of its political, cultural and linguistic diversity. But we have seen
that such a diversity was rather detrimental in the Shanghai ranking. Hence, at
this point, many things are in the hands of the Brussels oﬃcials. If they think
that a ranking produced in China can be a sound basis to engage into major
reforms of European higher education system, they are kindly invited not to do
anything. If they think that Europe’s cultural, linguistic, and political diversity
is of any value, action is urgently needed. In the course of writing this text,
we discovered that a call for tenders on this point was launched on 11 Decem-
ber 2008, see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IP/08/1942&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, last accessed
30 March 2009. This is a very positive signal and we would like to conclude on
this brighter note.
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